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Long Term Disability Benefits are Subject to Income Tax: a Case Comment on Tsiaprailis v. Canada
Prepared By Robert Omura

The content of this article is intended to be informational only. We caution you against using or relying upon any information contained in this article without first seeking legal advice regarding your particular matter. All matters arising from the use of our website, including this article, shall be governed by Alberta law and shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Alberta.

 

 

 

            On February 25, 2005 a divided Supreme Court of Canada released their reasons in Tsiaprailis v. Canada, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 113, in a case involving whether a lump sum settlement of a long term disability claim (“LTD”) is subject to income tax. The Supreme Court ruled 4-3 that despite the fact the sums were paid under a release of liability for a law suit, the sums paid were in fact to replace lost income, both past and future and therefore subject to income tax. The Court applied the surrogatum principle. The surrogatum principle made replacement sums paid on account of past lost income taxable in the taxpayer’s hands. Simply put, the surrogatum principle says that the tax treatment of a transaction will depend on what the amount was intended to replace. As a result of Tsiaprailis any amount which can be attributed to arrears of past income or wage loss replacement are taxable, and where it is not clearly delineated in a settlement the Minister may reasonably allocate a sum to represent the wage loss replacement or lost income. It is another in a series of decisions that have taken a pragmatic approach to disentangling lump sum settlements or awards to characterize their constituent parts for tax treatment.

 

In the workers’ compensation context an award from a compensation board as a result of a worker’s illness, injury or death in the performance of his duties of employment is not taxable but must be claimed as income: IT202R2, Employees’ or Workers’ Compensation. The award is deducted from total income to establish the taxpayer’s taxable income. This exception does not extent to awards received from an arbitrator: see Vincent v. Canada, [1988] T.C.J. No. 503.

 

In the personal injury context, however, it is generally understood in Canada that all amounts received by a taxpayer or a taxpayer’s dependents for general or special damages for personal injury or death are excluded from income even if the amount may have been determined with reference to the loss of earnings of the taxpayer. However, an amount that can reasonably be considered to be for past lost income from employment rather than an award of damages will be included as income: see IT-365R2, Damages, Settlements and Similar Receipts.

 

            Normally an amount received as damages in a wrongful dismissal claim is not taxable as income: Canada v. Atkins, [1976] F.C.J. No. 411 (C.A.), Girouard v. Canada, [1980] F.C.J. No. 137 (C.A.), Canada v. Pollock, [1984] C.T.C.353 (F.C.A.), and Buccini v. Canada, [2000] F.C.J. No. 1892 (C.A.).  Furthermore, a sum paid to cancel an employment contract before the employee has even provided services is not taxable as income: see Schwartz v. Canada, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 254.

 

However, sums paid under a LTD insurance plan are specifically included under s. 6(1)(f)(ii) of the Income Tax Act as taxable benefits. Any amount received on a periodic basis by an employee as compensation for loss of income that was payable under a sickness, accident, disability or wage loss replacement plan to which an employer contributes, are to be included as income except for a deduction for employee contributions: see IT-428, Wage Loss Replacement Plans. Sums previously paid by an employee for insurance premiums are deductible against the wage loss replacement benefits received, but are restricted to premiums paid by that employee to the particular plan from which the benefits were received. However, any wage loss replacement benefits that are paid under an “employee-pay-all plan” are not taxable. This is equally true where an employer merely deducts from an employee’s salary the insurance premiums. In both exemptions the insurance premiums are paid by the employee from “after tax” money.

 

The rationale seems to be that an employer’s disability insurance plan, to the extend of the employer’s contribution on behalf of the employee, is in actuality a tax deferral vehicle which becomes a taxable benefit in the employee’s hands once he or she draws wage loss replacement benefits. Conversely, where the employee pays for the whole of the disability insurance plan from “after-tax” funds, such funds are not on account for income but in the nature of expenditures for personal or living expenses or on account of capital.

 

Underlying the principle of taxable benefits is the concept of horizontal equity. Of the principle of horizontal equity Vern Krishna says: “ [T]he principle of horizontal equity requires taxpayers in comparable financial and personal circumstances to bear comparable burdens of tax. Thus, the tax treatment of benefits is important to the principle of fairness in taxation. Unjustified exclusions of benefit from income distort the tax system, undermine its integrity, and erode taxpayer confidence in the self-assessment and voluntary compliance system.”: Vern Krishna, Income Tax Law (1997), Chapter 4, Employment Income, D. Benefits (QL). From the principle of horizontal equity it follows that if the transaction does not improve the employee’s position it should not be considered a taxable benefit.

 

 

Section 6(1)(f) of the Income Tax Act

 

            Section 6 deals specifically with taxable benefits to be included in determining income from office or employment. The relevant portions of the Income Tax Act read as follows:

 

            6(1) there shall be included in computing the income of a taxpayer for a taxation year as income from an office or employment such of the following amounts as are applicable:

 

(a)       value of benefits – the value of board, lodging and other benefits of any kind whatsoever received or enjoyed by the taxpayer in the year in respect of, in the course of, or by virtue of an office or employment …

 

(b)       personal or living expenses …

 

(c)       director’s or other fees …

 

(d)       allocations, etc., under profit sharing plan …

 

(e)       standby charge for automobile …

 

(f)        employment insurance benefits – the total of all amounts received by the taxpayer in the year that were payable to the taxpayer on a periodic basis in respect of the loss of all or any part of the taxpayer’s income from an office or employment pursuant to

 

                        (i) a sickness or accident insurance plan,

                        (ii) a disability insurance plan, or

                        (iii) an income maintenance insurance plan

 

to or under which the taxpayer’s employer has made a contribution …

 

(g)              employee benefit plan benefits …

 

(h)              employee trust …

 

(i)                 salary deferral arrangement payments …

 

(j)                 reimbursements and awards …

 

(k)               automobile operating expense benefit …

 

 

The Facts and the Lower Courts

 

            The facts of Tsiaprailis are straightforward. Vasiliki Tsiaprailis worked for many years as a press machine operator for which she was entitled to long term disability benefits through Manulife under a collective bargaining agreement. The insurance premiums were paid solely by her employer. None of the premiums were included as part of her income as a taxable benefit. The policy provided long term disability benefits of 66 2/3% of her monthly earnings up to a maximum of $1,100.00 less any Canada Pension Plan benefits she was entitled to receive. Benefits were paid monthly up to her 65th birthday or until she ceased to be totally disabled.

 

In November, 1984 Ms. Tsiaprailis was permanently disabled as a result of a motor vehicle accident. She received benefits from May, 1985 to May, 1993 less her CPP benefits. In July, 1993 Manulife terminated her benefits. She commenced legal proceedings against Manulife for continuance of her benefits which were settled in October, 1996 for a lump sum payment of $105,000.00. The sum represented past benefits plus interest, 75% of the present value of future benefits, and legal costs, GST and disbursements.

 

Upon review of Ms. Tsiaprailis’ income Revenue Canada issued a notice of reassessment including the whole of the $105,000.00 settlement as income for the 1996 taxation year. Ms. Tsiaprailis appealed the reassessment.

 

            The Tax Court of Canada reversed the reassessment. Bowman A.C.J.T.C. held that a lump sum payment made as a result of a compromise in a law suit did not fit within s. 6(1)(f) of the Act as it was not an amount payable to the taxpayer on a periodic basis, nor could it be characterized as a payment in respect of Ms. Tsiaprailis’ employment. The Crown appealed.

 

            At the Federal Court of Appeal Pelletier J.A. (Strayer J.A. concurring) overturned the decision of Bowman A.C.J.T.C. A payment is no less payable on a periodic basis, Justice Pelletier reasoned, even if it is lumped and paid late. With sufficient evidence it was possible to characterize portions of a settlement as in respect of income or capital. Characterization of an amount was a question of the whole of the evidence even if a signed release characterized the whole of the payment as damages. Therefore, the amounts paid to Ms. Tsiaprailis in respect of arrears of disability benefits were taxable because, even though they were paid as a lump sum under a compromise of a law suit, they were still in respect of amounts payable on a periodic basis. Ms. Tsiaprailis appealed.

 

 

The Supreme Court of Canada

           

            Justice Charron for 4 of the 7 Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal. Both the majority led by Charron J. (Bastarache, Binnie and Deschamps JJ. concurring) and the minority led by Abella J. (Major and LeBell JJ. concurring) agree that payments made to settle future benefits under a disability insurance plan are not made “pursuant to” the plan as there is no obligation to make a lump sum payment for future benefits under the plan, so such payments are in the nature of capital. The difference between the two sides is as to characterization of the sums allocated for arrears of wage loss replacement benefits. For the majority it is not the characterization of the settlement that is the focus of the inquiry but the tax liability of the insured, so the inquiry should look at what the sums paid represent. In aid of such determinations Charron J. applies the surrogatum principle and puts forth two questions: (1) what was the payment intended to replace?, and (2) would the replaced amount have been taxable in the recipient’s hands? From the evidence it was clear that a portion of the settlement was paid to Ms. Tsiaprailis for past lost income. Therefore, that portion was taxable in Ms. Tsiaprailis’ hands.

 

            In rejecting the majority approach Abella J. for 3 of the 7 Justices agreed with Evans J.A., dissenting, of the Federal Court of Appeal in holding that the sums were paid to obtain a release from liability and not “pursuant to” a disability insurance policy.  The sum consisted of an amount to extinguish the claim for accumulated arrears, an amount to extinguish the claim for future benefits and an amount to extinguish the claim for costs. In the terms of settlement Manulife denied liability under the insurance contract and throughout the law suit and settlement process expressly disputed Ms. Tsiaprailis’ claim. Although the amounts paid under the claim related to sums that might have been payable under the insurance policy as wage loss replacement, they were in fact not paid under the insurance policy. The amounts that might have been payable under the insurance policy were used only to gauge whether the compromise settlement was reasonable. The sums were paid as a global settlement of liability. In this case the surrogatum principle does not apply and the settlement sums are not taxable.

 

 

The Surrogatum Principle and Damages in Wrongful Dismissal Cases

 

            The case law has been overwhelmingly in support of characterizing damages in wrongful dismissal cases as not taxable, however, the Tsiaprailis characterization questions, based on the surrogatum principle, may give rise to another attempt to reverse the current state of the law. Under the surrogatum principle damages in wrongful dismissal cases can easily be characterized as “replacement” sums for sums that would otherwise be taxable (i.e., lost income). Currently, the view is that sums paid in lieu of proper notice of termination are not salary, wages, remuneration or a benefit received in respect of, in the course of or by virtue of his office or employment, and therefore such sums are not taxable as income.

 

 

What about the Tax Treatment of the Amount Attributable for Future Income?

 

            Interestingly, one of the collateral results of the Tsiaprailis case is that a lump sum amount paid to discharge future obligations under a LTD insurance plan is not taxable as income in the taxpayer’s hands, even though the employer paid all the premiums. This creates a somewhat anomalous situation as the premiums are now an unpaid taxable benefit to the taxpayer. Sums received to replace past lost income are to be characterized differently than sums received to extinguish future claims. In April, 2005 the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) accepted that such payments are not taxable as income, but has decided to tax those amounts as capital gains. The sums are characterized as the proceeds of the disposition of a capital property, being the taxpayer’s rights under the LTD insurance contract.

 

            The implication of the CRA’s approach is that sums, such as a settlement of liability pursuant to a LTD insurance contract, to compensate for lost income or for lost property may be taxed as on account of income or on account for capital, even in personal injury cases where it is possible, on the whole of the evidence, to allocate a portion to income or capital. In the case of an allocation on account of capital, however, there must be a disposition of property: see Ipsco Ltd. v. Canada, [2002] T.C.J. 110.

 

For further information please do not hesitate to contract the author of this Article, Robert Omura

 

 


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